My official research area is the philosophy of mind, but I am interested in virtually all the perennial problems of philosophy, as well as the history of tackling them. Currently I am focused on three main projects. The first concerns the value of consciousness: what epistemic, ethical, and aesthetic value might our conscious experience have, and why? The second concerns the nature of moral awareness: are the most foundational forms of moral awareness emotional, rational, both, or neither - and what difference does that make to our grasp of right and wrong? My third main project is in fundamental ontology: what ontological categories do the basic units of reality - "the alphabet of being" - belong to, and how can we tell?
 

The Structure of Phenomenal Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2023.

Egalitarian vs. Elitist Plenitude. Philosophical Studies 2022.

Moral Judgment and the Content-Attitude Distinction. Philosophical Studies 2022.

The Intentional Structure of Moods. Philosophers’ Imprint 2019.

The Value of Consciousness. Analysis 2019.

Brentano's Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2018.

Cognitivism About Emotion and the Alleged Hyperopacity of Emotional Content. Philosophical Studies 2016.

Thought and Thing: Brentano’s Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2015.

Experiencing the Present. Analysis 2015.

A Hesitant Defense of Introspection. Philosophical Studies 2013.

The Epistemological Challenge of Revisionary Metaphysics. Philosophers’ Imprint 2013.

Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2012.

The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 2011.

Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 2010.

Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 2009.

The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 2008.

Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 2007.

Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2005.

Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 2003.